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Abstract
The neighbourhood-based Collaborative Filtering is a widely used method in recom-
mender systems. However, the risks of revealing customers’ privacy during the process of
filtering have attracted noticeable public concern recently. Specifically, kNN attack dis-
closes the target user’s sensitive information by creating k fake nearest neighbours by non-
sensitive information. Among the current solutions against kNN attack, the probabilistic
methods showed a powerful privacy preserving effect. However, the existing probabilis-
tic methods neither guarantee enough prediction accuracy due to the global randomness,
nor provide assured security enforcement against kNN attack. To overcome the problems
of current probabilistic methods, we propose a novel approach, Partitioned Probabilistic
Neighbour Selection, to ensure a required security guarantee while achieving the optimal
prediction accuracy against kNN attack. In this paper, we define the sum of k neighbours’
similarity as the accuracy metric α, the number of user partitions, across which we select
the k neighbours, as the security metric β. Differing from the present methods that glo-
bally selected neighbours, our method selects neighbours from each group with exponential
differential privacy to decrease the magnitude of noise. Theoretical and experimental ana-
lysis show that to achieve the same security guarantee against kNN attack, our approach
ensures the optimal prediction accuracy.
Keywords: Privacy Preserving, Differential Privacy, Neighbourhood-based Collaborative
Filtering, Internet Commerce
Topics Differential Privacy, Privacy Metrics, Privacy in Recommender Systems
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1 Introduction
Recommender systems predict customers’ potential preferences by aggregating history data
and customers’ interests. Recently, the increasing importance of recommender systems in vari-
ous Internet applications should be noticed. For example, Amazon has been receiving benefits
for a decade from the recommender systems by providing personal recommendation to their
customers, and Netflix posted a one million U.S. dollars award for improving their recommender
system to make their business more profitable [8, 12, 23]. Currently, in recommender systems,
Collaborative Filtering (CF) is a famous technology with three main popular algorithms [14],
i.e., neighbourhood-based methods [8], association rules based prediction [11], and matrix fac-
torisation [13]. Among these algorithms, neighbourhood-based methods are the most widely
used in the industry because of its easy implementation and high prediction accuracy.
One of the most popular neighbourhood-based CF method is k Nearest Neighbour (kNN)
method which provides recommendations by aggregating the opinions of a user’s k nearest
neighbours [2]. Although kNN method efficiently presents good recommendation performance
of accuracy, the risk of customers’ privacy disclosure during the process of filtering is a growing
concern, e.g., the kNN attack [5] which exploits the property that the users are more similar
when sharing same ratings on corresponding non-sensitive items to reveal user’s sensitive in-
formation. Thus proposing an efficient privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF algorithm
against kNN attack, which obtains trade-off between the system security and recommendation
accuracy, has been a natural research problem.
The literature in CF recommender systems has shown several approaches to preserve cus-
tomers’ privacy. Generally, cryptographic methods, obfuscation, perturbation, randomised
methods (including naive probabilistic methods and differential privacy methods) are ap-
plied [27]. Among them, cryptographic methods [9, 19] provide the most reliable security
but the unnecessary computational cost cannot be ignored. Obfuscation methods [20, 25] and
Perturbation methods [3, 4] introduce designed random noise into the original matrix to pre-
serve customers’ sensitive information; however the magnitude of noise is hard to calibrate in
these two types of methods [7, 27]. The naive probabilistic method [1] provides a similarity
based weighted neighbour selection for the k neighbours. Similar to perturbation, McSherry et
al. [17] presented a naive differential privacy method which adds calibrated noise into the co-
variance (similarity between users/items) matrix. Similar to the naive probabilistic neighbour
selection [1], Zhu et al. [27] proposed a Private Neighbour CF to preserve privacy against kNN
attack by introducing differential privacy in selecting the k nearest neighbours randomly, then
adding Laplace differential noise into covariance matrix. Although the methods in [1, 17, 27]
successfully preserve users’ privacy against kNN attack, the low prediction accuracy due to the
global randomness should be remarked. Moreover, as privacy preserving CF recommendation
algorithms, none of the existing randomised methods provide an assured security enforcement
before the process of filtering.
Contributions. In this paper, to overcome the problems of unsatisfactory prediction
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accuracy and unassured security guarantee in the existing probabilistic approaches against
kNN attack, we propose a novel method, Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection. The
main contributions of this paper are:
• We define performance metrics clearly in both prediction accuracy and system security
to theoretically analyse the performance of privacy preserving CF method. Specifically,
we define the sum of k neighbours’ similarity as the accuracy metric α, the number of
user partitions, across which we select the k neighbours, as the security metric β.
• We propose a novel differential privacy preserving method, Partitioned Probabilistic
Neighbour Selection (PPNS), which achieves the optimal prediction accuracy α with
a given desired system security β among all of the existing developments of randomised
neighbourhood-based CF recommendation algorithms.
• We show that, compared with the related methods, the proposed PPNS method performs
consistently well across various experimental settings. For example, we compare the
accuracy performance on different datasets; we design the experiments on both user-
based and item-based neighbourhood-based CF; we examine the accuracy performance
in the scenario with and without kNN attack.
Organisation. The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Firstly, in Section 2, we discuss
both the advantages and disadvantages in the existing privacy preserving methods on CF
recommender systems. Then we introduce the relevant preliminaries in this paper in Section
3. Afterwards, we present a classic attacking against neighbourhood-based CF recommender
systems in Section 4. Next, we propose a novel differential privacy recommendation approach,
Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection in Section 5. In Section 6, the experimental
analysis of our approach on the performance of both recommendation accuracy and security
are provided. Finally, we conclude with a summary in Section 7.
2 Related Work
A noticeable number of literature has been published on privacy risks to preserve customers’
private data in recommender systems. In this section, we briefly discuss some of the research
literature in privacy preserving CF recommender systems.
2.1 Traditional Privacy Preserving CF Recommendation
Amount of traditional privacy preserving methods have been developed in CF recommender
systems [27], including cryptographic [9,19], obfuscation [20,25], perturbation [3,4] and prob-
abilistic methods [1]. Erkin et al. [9] applied homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party
computation in privacy preserving recommender systems, which allows users to jointly com-
pute their data to receive recommendation without sharing the true data with other parties.
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Nikolaenko et al. [19] combined a famous recommendation technique, matrix factorization,
and a cryptographic method, garbled circuits, to provide recommendations without learning
the real user ratings in database. The Cryptographic methods provide the highest guaran-
tee for both prediction security ans system security by introducing encryption rather than
adding noise to the original record. Unfortunately, unnecessary computational cost impacts
its application in industry [27]. Obfuscation and perturbation are two similar data processing
methods. In particular, obfuscation methods aggregate a number of random noises with real
users rating to preserve user’s sensitive information. Parameswaran et al. [20] proposed an
obfuscation framework which exchanges the sets of similar items before submitting the user
data to CF server. Weinsberg et al. [25] introduced extra reasonable ratings into user’s profile
against inferring user’s sensitive information. Perturbation methods modify the user’s original
ratings by a selected probability distribution before using these ratings. Particularly, Bilge
et al. [4] added uniform distribution noise to the real ratings before the utilisation of user’s
rating in prediction process. While, Basu et al. [3] regarded the deviation between two items
as the adding noise. Both perturbation and obfuscation obtain good trade-off between pre-
diction accuracy and system security due to the tiny data perturbation, but the magnitude
of noise or the percentage of replaced ratings are not easy to be calibrated [7, 27]. The naive
probabilistic method [1] applied weighted sampling in the process of neighbour selection which
preserves users’ privacy against kNN attack successfully, because of the perturbation of the
final neighbour set; however, it cannot guarantee enough prediction accuracy due to the global
randomness. Moreover, these traditional privacy preserving CF methods are unable to measure
privacy levels against kNN attack, thus impairing the credibility of the final recommendation
result.
2.2 Differential Privacy CF Recommendation
As a well-known privacy definition, the differential privacy mechanism [6] has been applied in
the research of privacy preserving recommender systems. For example, McSherry et al. [17]
provided the first differential privacy neighbourhood-based CF recommendation algorithm.
Actually, the naive differential privacy protects the neighbourhood-based CF recommender
systems against kNN attack successfully, as they added Laplace noise into the covariance
matrix globally, so that the output neighbour set is no longer the original k neighbours (k
nearest candidates). However, the prediction accuracy of their recommendation algorithm is
decreased significantly due to the introduction of global noise.
Another development of differential privacy neighbourhood-based CF method, Private
Neighbour CF (PNCF), is proposed by [27] which inspires our work. They theoretically fixed
the low prediction accuracy problem of naive probabilistic neighbour selection [1] by a trun-
cated parameter λ. As a differential privacy method, the selection weight in PNCF method is
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measured by the following equation:
ωi = exp(

4k ×RSqa(U(ua), ui)), (1)
where  is differential privacy budge, q is the score function, RS is the Recommendation-Aware
Sensitivity of score function q for any user pair ui and uj , and U(ua) is the set of user ua’s
candidate list. For a user ua, the score function q and its Recommendation-Aware Sensitivity
are defined as:
qa(U(ua), ui) = sim(a, i), (2)
RS = max
maxs∈Sij
 ri,s · rj,s
‖r′i‖
∥∥∥r′j∥∥∥
 ,max
s∈Sij
ri,s · rj,s
(
‖ri‖ ‖rj‖ − ‖r′i‖
∥∥∥r′j∥∥∥)
‖ri‖ ‖rj‖ ‖r′i‖
∥∥∥r′j∥∥∥
 , (3)
where ri,s is user ui’s rating on item ts, sim(a, i) is the similarity between user ua and ui, ri is
user ui’s average rating on every item, Sij is the set of all items co-rated by both users i and
j, i.e., Sij = {s ∈ S|ri,s 6= ∅ & rj,s 6= ∅}.
Then, the PNCF method selects the k neighbours which include the candidates whose
similarity is greater than (simk + λ) and randomised candidates whose similarity is between
(simk + λ) and (simk − λ), where simk denotes the similarity of the kth candidate of a
target user. Zhu et al. [27] provided an equation to calculate the value of λ, i.e. λ =
min(simk,
4k·RS
 ln
k(n−k)
ρ ), where ρ is a constant, 0 < ρ < 1. Once having the k neighbours set,
Zhu et al. [27] added Laplace differential noise in the final k neighbour’s similarity matrix to
perturb the final prediction. Their experimental results showed better prediction performance
than [17].
We observe that PNCF [27] has two weaknesses. Firstly, it unnecessarily adds random noise
in the process of filtering twice (one at neighbour selection stage, another at rating prediction
stage), the extra randomness will decrease the prediction accuracy significantly. Secondly,
the value of λ may not be achievable. This is because the computation of λ results in a
good theoretical recommendation accuracy, but does not yield a good experimental prediction
accuracy on the given test data sets in [27] against kNN attack. So the PNCF method [27]
will actually be a method of naive Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1] and cannot guarantee
enough recommendation accuracy.
In conclusion, compared with cryptographic, obfuscation and perturbation privacy pre-
serving methods, the probabilistic methods are more efficient. The existing Probabilistic solu-
tions [1, 17, 27] on privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems applied
different randomised strategies to improve the prediction accuracy, while ensure the security
against kNN attack by selecting the k neighbours across a target user’s partial/entire candidate
list. However, they failed to guarantee enough prediction accuracy due to the introduction of
global noise. Additionally, as privacy preserving CF recommendation algorithms, none of the
existing randomised methods provide an assured security enforcement before the process of CF
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recommendation against kNN attack. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to propose a randomised
privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommendation algorithm which guarantees an
assured security firstly, then achieves the optimal prediction accuracy with the assured security
guarantee.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the foundational concepts related with this paper in collaborative
filtering, differential privacy, and Wallenius’ non-central hypergeometric distribution.
3.1 k Nearest Neighbour Collaborative Filtering
k Nearest Neighbour collaborative filtering is the most popular recommendation method in
neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems, which predicts customer’s potential prefer-
ences by aggregating the opinions of the k most similar neighbours [2].
Neighbour Selection and Rating Prediction are two main steps in neighbourhood-based
CF [27]. At the Neighbour Selection stage, k nearest candidates are selected from the target
user ua’s candidate list Sa, where similarities between ua and any other users are calculated
by similarity measurement metric. There are two famous similarity measurement metrics: the
Pearson correlation coefficient and Cosine-based similarity [2]. In this paper, we use the Cosine-
based similarity [21] as the similarity measurement metric because of its lower complexity.
sim(i, j) =
∑
s∈Sij ri,srj,s√∑
s∈Si r
2
i,s
√∑
s∈Sj r
2
j,s
, (4)
where sim(i, j) is the similarity between user ui and uj , ri,s is user ui’s rating on item ts,
ri,s ∈ R, R is the user-item rating dataset, r¯i is user ui’s average rating on every item, Sij is
the set of all items co-rated by both user ui and uj , i.e., Sij = {s ∈ S|ri,s 6= ∅ & rj,s 6= ∅}, Si
is the set of all items rated by user ui, i.e., Si = {s ∈ S|ri,s 6= ∅}.
At the stage of Rating Prediction, to predict the potential rating rˆax of user ua on item tx,
all ratings on tx of the k selected users (which are called neighbours) will be aggregated. For
example, for user-based methods, the prediction of rˆax is shown as below:
rˆax =
∑
ui∈Nk(ua) sim(a, i)ri,x∑
ui∈Nk(ua) |sim(a, i)|
, (5)
where, Nk(ua) is a sorted set which contains user ua’s k nearest neighbours, Nk(ua) is sorted
by similarity in a descending order, sim(a, i) is the ith neighbour of ua in Nk(ua).
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3.2 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy [6] is a scheme that minimises the sensitivity of output for a
given statistical operation on two different (differentiated in one record to protect) datasets.
Specifically, differential privacy guarantees whether one specific record appears or does not
appear in a database, the privacy mechanism will shield the specific record to the adversary.
The strategy of differential privacy is adding a random calibrated noise to the result of a query
function on the database. We say two datasets X and X ′ are neighbouring dataset, if they
differ in only one record at most. A formal definition of Differential Privacy is shown as follows:
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy [6]). A randomised mechanism T is -differential privacy
if for all neighbouring datasets X and X ′, and for all outcome sets S ⊆ Range(T ), T satisfies:
Pr[T (X) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · Pr[T (X ′) ∈ S], where  is a privacy budget.
Definition 2 (Exponential Differential Privacy Mechanism [18]). Given a score function of a
database X, q(X,x), which reflects the score of query respond x. The exponential mechanism T
provides -differential privacy, if T (X) = {the probability of a query respond x ∝ exp( ·q(X,x)2∆q )},
where ∆q = max |q(X,x)− q(X ′, x)|, denotes the sensitivity of q.
3.3 Wallenius’ Non-central Hypergeometric Distribution
Briefly, Wallenius’ Non-central Hypergeometric Distribution is a distribution of weighted sam-
pling without replacement [24]. We assume there are c categories in the population, category
i contains mi individuals. All the individuals in category i have the same weight ωi. The
probability of an individual is sampled at a given draw is proportional to its weight ωi.
In this paper, we use the following properties of Wallenius’ Non-central Hypergeometric Dis-
tribution to find the optimal prediction accuracy neighbour selection with a given security guar-
antee against kNN attack. [16] gave the approximated solution to the mean µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µc)
of x = (x1, x2, . . . , xc), where xi denotes the number of individuals sampled from category i
by Wallenius’ Non-central Hypergeometric Distribution,
∑c
i=1 xi =
∑c
i=1 µi = k:(
1− µ
?
1
m1
)1/ω1
=
(
1− µ
?
2
m2
)1/ω2
= . . . =
(
1− µ
?
c
mc
)1/ωc
, (6)
where
∑c
i=1 µ
?
i = k, ∀i ∈ C : 0 ≤ µ?i ≤ mi.
The solution µ? = (µ?1, µ
?
2, . . . , µ
?
c) is an approximation to the mean µ. Fog [10] stated the
following properties of Equation (6): firstly, the solution µ∗ is valid under the conditions that
∀i ∈ C : mi > 0 and ωi > 0. Secondly, the mean given by Equation (6) is a good approximation
in most cases. Thirdly, Equation (6) is exact when all ωi are equal.
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4 A Privacy Attacking on CF Recommender Systems
In this section, we introduce a classic neighbourhood-based CF attacking, k Nearest Neighbour
(kNN) attack. Calandrino et al. [5] presented a user-based attacking, k Nearest Neighbour
(kNN) attack, against the kNN CF recommendation algorithm. Simply, kNN attack exploits
the property that the users are more similar when sharing same ratings on corresponding items
to reveal user’s private data.
We suppose that an attacker’s background knowledge consists of both the recommendation
algorithm (kNN CF recommendation) and its parameter k. Furthermore, a target user ua’s
partial non-sensitive history ratings, i.e., the ratings on m items that ua voted, are known to
the attacker.
The aim of kNN attack is to disclose ua’s sensitive transactions that the attacker does
not yet know about. To achieve this goal, the attacker firstly registers k fake users in a kNN
recommender system who only vote on ua’s m non-sensitive items with same ratings of ua.
With a high probability, each fake user’s k nearest neighbours set Nk(fake user) will include
the other k − 1 fake users and the target user ua. Because the target user ua is the only
neighbour who has ratings on the items which are not rated by the fake users, to provide
recommendations on these items to the fake users, the recommender system has to give ua’s
rating to the fake users directly. Obviously, the fake users learn the target user ua’s whole
rating list successfully with kNN attack.
5 Privacy Preservation by Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour
Selection
In this section, we firstly present the motivations and the goal of this paper. Then we provide
two performance metrics on privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems
against kNN attack. Finally we propose our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection
algorithm based on our motivations and goal.
5.1 Motivation
Current research [1, 17, 27] on privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommender sys-
tems applied different randomised strategies to improve the prediction accuracy, while ensure
the security against kNN attack by selecting the k neighbours across a target user’s par-
tial/entire candidate list. Among these randomised strategies, differential privacy is a better
privacy preserving mechanism as it provides calibrated magnitude of noise.
Actually, since the information collected by recommender systems is always the customers’
personal data [5], preserving the users’ sensitive information should be the kernel issue of
recommender systems. But none of the existing privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF
recommendation algorithms ensure a successful security-assured privacy preservation against
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kNN attack before the process of CF recommendation. So in this paper, we present a security
metric to measure the level of system security.
In addition, the prediction accuracy should also be considered carefully with the guarantee
of assured security, otherwise, the recommender systems would be useless to the non-malicious
users who are the majority of customers. However, because of the introduction of global
noise, the current randomised methods cannot guarantee the prediction accuracy either. To
provide enough prediction utility, we have to decrease the noise as much as possible. Since
there is no need to add noise into both the stage of neighbour selection and rating prediction,
we may simply add Laplace noise [6] to the final prediction rating after a regular kNN CF.
Unfortunately, as Sarathy et al. [22] reported the security risk about the Laplace mechanism
for numeric data, the above idea should be rejected. So we focus on adding noise at the stage
of neighbour selection. Instead of global neighbour selection, we partition the order candidate
list, so that we can control magnitude of noise inside each partition.
Therefore, in this paper, we aim to propose a partitioned probabilistic (differential privacy)
neighbour selection method, which guarantees an assured security, then achieves the maximum
prediction accuracy with the assured security against kNN attack, without any perturbations
in the process of rating prediction.
5.2 Performance Metrics
5.2.1 Accuracy
Naturally, in any neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems, aggregating the ratings of
more similar users yields more reliable prediction. Therefore, we define the accuracy perfor-
mance metric α as the similarity sum of the k neighbours of a target user ua. Obviously, the
greatest value of α would be the similarity sum of the k nearest candidates of a target user.
It is simple to compute α in the deterministic neighbourhood-based CF algorithms, e.g.
kNN CF recommendation algorithm, because the k neighbours selected by the deterministic
algorithms are determined. So in the case of deterministic algorithms, we compute α by the
following equation,
α =
k∑
i=1
sim(a, neighbouri). (7)
While, in the randomised neighbourhood-based CF algorithms, because of the randomisa-
tion, we should calculate the value of α as the expected similarity sum of the k neighbours
by
α = E(
k∑
i=1
sim(a, neighbouri)). (8)
However, it is difficult to compute Equation (8) directly, as we need to find all the possible
k-neighbour combinations and their corresponding probabilities. So we give another way to
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compute the expectation in Equation (8), shown in blow:
α = E(
∑k
i=1 sim(a, neighbouri))
=
∑n
i=1 sim(a, useri)E(xi)
=
∑n
i=1 sim(a, useri)µi,
(9)
where
∑n
i=1 µi = k, µi ∈ [0, 1). Section 3.3 introduced the definition of xi and µi.
Actually, when useri is selected as a neighbour of the target user ua, µi = 1, while when
useri is not a neighbour of ua, µi = 0. Namely, in this paper, deterministic algorithms
(Equation (7)) is a special case of randomised algorithms (Equation (9)). Therefore, we com-
pute the accuracy metric α by the following equation in both deterministic and randomised
neighbourhood-based CF recommendation algorithms:{
α =
∑n
i=1 sim(a, useri)µi,
k =
∑n
i=1 µi.
(10)
5.2.2 Security
According to the property of kNN attack, the purpose of a privacy preserving neighbourhood-
based CF recommendation algorithm is to avoid the target user being the only real user in
the final k neighbours set. Thus, the existing probabilistic privacy preserving solutions select
the k neighbours across the partial/entire candidate list. It is obvious that the number of
candidates who may be selected into the k neighbours set decides the success probability of
kNN attack (we call these candidates as potential neighbours). Namely, the more potential
neighbours result in the less probability that the target user is the only real user in the final
k neighbours set. On the other side, the attacker needs to create enough fake users to cover
the potential neighbours set, so that the target user can be the only real user. That is to say,
the more potential neighbours yield the higher attacking cost. In conclusion, in this paper,
because we partition the candidate list by the given k, we define the number of user partitions,
across which we select the k neighbours, as the security metric β.
5.3 Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection Scheme
To achieve our goal, we will firstly provide the objective function with its constraints based
on the discussions on both two performance metrics. Then, we propose the security-assured
accuracy-maximised privacy preserving recommendation method by solving the objective func-
tion according to its constraints.
According to the security metric β and the properties of kNN attack, we partition the
entire candidate list of a user by the given k, i.e., the size of each partition (group) is k.
Before providing the objective function, we introduce some variables in advance. We use fβ(i)
to denote the number of neighbours selected (weighted sampling with exponential differential
privacy) from partition No. i with the given security metric β, i ∈ [1, β]. Additionally, αi
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denotes the prediction accuracy of partition No. i against kNN attack. Therefore, we have a
general equation for α,
α =
β∑
i=1
αi. (11)
To solve the Equation (11) for the optimal α with the given security metric β against kNN
attack, we select one random fake user as the user who receives the system recommendation.
We suppose the candidate list of the fixed fake user has already in a descending order of
similarity. Figure 1 shows the fixed fake user’s candidate list, where Ni denotes to the user set
in partition i, i ∈ [2, β], ua is the attacker’s target user.
Partition Number 1 2 · · · β − 1 β
Partition Content Fake users + ua N2 · · · Nβ−1 Nβ
Figure 1: Candidate list against kNN attack
According to formulas (10) and Figure 1, we have
αi =
k∑
j=1
simj,Niµj,Ni , (12)
where simj,Ni denotes the similarity between jth candidate in partition No. i and the fixed
fake user, µj,Ni denotes the corresponding mean µ, in ∈ [1, β]. Moreover, because we aim to
select fβ(i) neighbours from partition No. i,
∑k
j=1 µj,Ni = fβ(i).
Combining Equation (11) and Equation (12), we have
α =
β∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
simj,Niµj,Ni . (13)
Since the similarity between the candidates in partition No. 1 and the fixed fake users is
absolutely one, we rewrite the above equation as
α = fβ(1) +
β∑
i=2
k∑
j=1
simj,Niµj,Ni . (14)
Obviously, the Equation (14) is our objective function against kNN attack.
Now we give the constraints of Equation (14). Since we need to select the k neighbours
across the top β partitions, we should select at least one neighbour from partition No. β,
i.e., fβ(β) =
∑k
i=1 µi,Nβ ≥ 1. As the candidate list is in a descending order of similarity,
and we select one neighbour from the partition No. β, to cover all the top β partitions, the
attacker needs to create at least βk fake users, no matter how many neighbours are selected
from the partition No. i, i ∈ [1, β − 1]. So we can select zero neighbour from the partition
No. i, i ∈ [1, β − 1]. In addition, because fβ(β) ≥ 1 and
∑β
i=1 fβ(i) = k, fβ(i) ≤ k − 1
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for i ∈ [1, β − 1]. Recalling the other constraints we presented previously, we have the final
objective function with constraints as follow:
maximise α = fβ(1) +
∑β
i=2
∑k
j=1 simj,Niµj,Ni
subject to
∑k
j=1 µj,Ni = fβ(i)∑β
i=1 fβ(i) = k
fβ(i) ∈
{
[1, k], i = β
[0, k − 1], i ∈ [1, β)
(15)
Then, we solve Linear Programming (15) as a Knapsack Problem with the property of
Equation (6). The solution, that is the partitioned probabilistic neighbour selection method
which guarantees the optimal expectation of prediction accuracy α with a given security metric
β against kNN attack is:
fβ(i) =

k − 1, i = 1
1, i = β
0, i ∈ (1, β)
. (16)
Note that because ∀ β ≥ 1, the candidate list of any user is in a descending order of similarity,
formula (16) will always be the optimal solution to Linear Programming (15) for any β ≥ 1.
Algorithm 1 demonstrates the Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection (PPNS) method.
From line 1 to line 5, we compute the necessary parameters by Equation (4), (3), (2) and (1).
We select the k neighbours from each partition with exponential differential privacy by Par-
titioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection (Equation (16)) in line 6. Next, once we have the
k neighbours of target user ua, we compute the prediction rating of ua on a item rx, rax, by
Equation (5) in line 7. Finally, we return the neighbour set Nk(ua) and the prediction rating
rax.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we use the real-world datasets to evaluate the performance on both accuracy
and security of our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection method. We begin by the
description of the datasets, then introduce the evaluation metric, finally perform a compar-
ative analysis of our method and some existing privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF
recommendation algorithms.
6.1 Data set and Evaluation Metric
In the experiments, we use two real-world datasets, MovieLens dataset1 and Douban2 (one of
the largest rating websites in China) film dataset3. The MovieLens dataset consists of 100,000
1http://www.grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
2http://www.douban.com
3https://www.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/irwin.king/pub/data/douban
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Algorithm 1 Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection.
Input:
Original user-item rating set, R;
Target user, ua and prediction item, tx;
Number of neighbours, k;
Differential privacy parameter, ;
Security metric, β.
Output:
Target user ua’s k-neighbour set, Nk(ua);
Prediction rating of ua on tx, rax.
1: Compute the similarity array for target user ua, Sa;
2: Sort Sa in descending order, S ′a;
3: Compute exponential differential privacy sensitivity, RS;
4: Compute each user ui’s selection weight, ωi;
5: Partition the sorted S ′a by k;
6: Select k neighbours from top β partitions;
7: Compute rax by Nk(ua);
8: return Nk(ua), rax;
ratings (1-5 integral stars) from 943 users on 1682 films, where each user has voted more
than 20 films, and each film received 20−250 users’ rating. The Douban film dataset contains
16,830,839 ratings (1-5 integral starts) from 129,490 unique users on 58,541 unique films [15].
We use a famous measurement metric, Mean Absolute Error (MAE) [26, 27], to measure
the recommendation accuracy, in the experiments:
MAE =
1
UI
U∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
|rij − rˆij |, (17)
where rij is the real rating of user ui on item tj , and rˆij is the corresponding predicted
rating from recommendation algorithms, U and I denote the number of users and items in the
experiments. Specifically, in user-based experiments, we compute the MAE of ratings from 200
random users (U = 200) on all the items (I = 1682 or I = 58, 541) in the two datasets, while,
in item-based experiments, we compute the MAE of ratings on 200 random items (I = 200)
from all the users (U = 943 or U = 129, 490) in the two datasets. In addition, we only predict
the rˆij for the rij 6= 0. Obviously, a lower MAE denotes a higher prediction accuracy, e.g.,
MAE = 0 means the prediction is totally correct because the prediction ratings equal to the
real ratings, but no privacy guarantee against kNN attack.
6.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we show the accuracy performance from different perspectives of four main
neighbourhood-based CF methods, i.e., k Nearest Neighbour (kNN), naive Probabilistic Neigh-
bour Selection (nPNS) [1], Private Neighbour CF (PNCF) [27] and our method, Partitioned
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Probabilistic Neighbour Selection (PPNS). Due to the similarity metric (Cosine-based similar-
ity, Equation (4)) used in this paper, in the second half of a candidate list, a large number of
candidates’ similarity will be zero which is useless for prediction. So in the experiments, we
set the upper bound of β as U/2k (user-based prediction) or I/2k (item-based prediction).
6.2.1 Accuracy performance with no attacking
We design three experiments (Figure 2 - Figure 4) to examine the user-based and item-based
CF prediction accuracy on MovieLens dataset and Douban film dataset. As seen in Figure 2 to
Figure 4, we notice that our privacy preserving method (PPNS) achieves much better accuracy
performance than the two global methods (nPNS and PNCF) in both the two datasets on both
user-based and item-based CF. Moreover, as a trade-off between the prediction accuracy and
system security in PPNS, a greater security metric β results in a greater MAE which means
a worse prediction accuracy. Specifically, when β = 1, PPNS achieves the same prediction
accuracy with the kNN method which is regarded as the baseline neighbourhood-based CF
recommendation method in this paper.
β
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0.6
0.7
0.8
kNN
nPNS
PNCF
PPNS
Figure 2: Item-based prediction accuracy on MovieLens ( = 1, k = 100)
6.2.2 Accuracy performance against kNN attack
To examine the accuracy performance of the four methods against kNN attack with the same
security guarantee, we introduce a fixed security metric β to the three privacy preserving CF
algorithms (nPNS, PNCF, PPNS). That is, we randomly select k neighbours from the βk
nearest candidates with weighted sampling in nPNS; we calculate λ as simk−simβk in PNCF;
and we select the k neighbours across the top β partitions by Algorithm 1 in PPNS. The
experiments are run on user-based CF because kNN attack is a user-based attacking.
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Figure 3: User-based prediction accuracy on MovieLens ( = 1, k = 100)
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Figure 4: User-based prediction accuracy on Douban film ( = 1, k = 100)
Figure 5 shows that to ensure the same security guarantee against kNN attack, PPNS
performs much better on the prediction accuracy than the other privacy preserving CF methods
(nPNS and PNCF). Moreover, the MAE performance of the kNN method indicates that kNN
CF does not provide any security guarantee against kNN attack. Additionally, as we regard
β as security metric, we observe that we achieve a trade-off between accuracy and security,
because the greater β yields a greater MAE which denotes less prediction accuracy.
15
β
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
M
AE
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
kNN
nPNS
PNCF
PPNS
Figure 5: Prediction accuracy on MovieLens against kNN attack ( = 1, k = 50, m = 8)
Figure 6 demonstrates the impacts of recommendation parameter k on the prediction ac-
curacy. We examine the value of k from 10 to 100, which is a popular range for the recommen-
dation parameter k. From Figure 6, we can see that a larger size of neighbour set (or the size
of partition in PPNS) denotes the better prediction accuracy of PPNS method against kNN
attack.
k
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Figure 6: Impacts of k on prediction accuracy against kNN attack on MovieLens ( = 1,
m = 8, β = 7)
Figure 7 illustrates the impacts of differential privacy budge  on the prediction accuracy. It
is observed that as  increases, the MAE performance improves in the two differential privacy
methods (PNCF and PPNS). So to achieve a better prediction accuracy, it is suggested to set
a greater  against kNN attacks.
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Figure 7: Impacts of  on prediction accuracy against kNN attack on MovieLens (k = 50,
m = 8, β = 7)
Figure 8 presents the impacts of attacking parameter m on the prediction accuracy. we can
note that to reveal a target customer’s privacy by kNN attack, the attacker needs at least 23
real ratings of the target customer as auxiliary information, since when m ≥ 8, the MAE of
a non-privacy preserving CF (kNN) method is zero. When the attacker has more background
knowledge, the prediction will be closer to the real ratings for all of the neighbourhood-based
CF systems, but none of privacy preserving algorithms releases the customer’s privacy.
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Figure 8: Impacts of m on prediction accuracy against kNN attack on MovieLens ( = 1,
k = 50, β = 7)
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7 Conclusion
Recommender systems play an important role in Internet commerce since the first decade of
21st century. To protect customers’ private information against kNN attack during the process
of filtering, the existing privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommendation methods
[1, 17, 27] introduced global noise into the covariance matrix and the process of neighbour
selection. However, they neither ensure the prediction accuracy because of the global noise, nor
guarantee an assured security enforcement before the collaborative filtering against kNN attack.
To overcome the weaknesses of the current probabilistic methods, we propose a novel privacy
preserving neighbourhood-based CF method, Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection, to
ensure a required security while achieving the optimal prediction accuracy against kNN attack.
The theoretical and experimental analysis show that achieving the same security guarantee
against kNN attack, our method ensures the optimal performance of recommendation accuracy
among the current randomised neighbourhood-based CF recommendation methods.
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